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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
JEROME K. DUNCAN, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
vs. 
EILEEN M. HOWARD; SANDRA 
THORDERSON and LARRY THORDERSON; 
STATE OF UTAH, Department of 
Human Services, 
Defendants/Appellants. 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANTS/THORDERSONS 
INTRODUCTION 
The appellants, Larry and Sandra Thorderson, will 
hereinafter be referred to as "Thordersons." The brief of 
appellants/Thordersons will hereinafter be referred to as 
"Thordersons' brief." The plaintiff/respondent will hereinafter 
be referred to "Jerry Duncan." The brief of respondent will 
hereinafter be referred to as "Duncan's brief." 
An addendum is attached to this reply brief, which is the 
memorandum decision of the Honorable John A. Rokich, dated December 
6, 1994. 
Duncan's brief contains two major points with several 
subpoints under Point I. Thordersons' reply brief will correspond 
with Points I and II of Duncan's brief wherever possible. 
Case No. 950227-CA 
Priority No. 4 
REPLY TO STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Jerry Duncan did not provide any means of financial 
support to the Thordersons for the care, support, maintenance and 
education of the minor child, Clel Howard. (R: 655, 862, 911.) 
2. Thordersons were the sole means of support to Clel 
Howard and provided the stable and consistent home environment. 
(R: 751, 754, 761-62, 854, 862, 1031, 1065-66, 1071.) 
3. Jerry Duncan portrays a consistent relationship with 
the minor child after his move to Utah. Nevertheless, Larry 
Thorderson reports that there were erratic visits by Jerry Duncan 
with the minor child and only sporadic telephone contact once the 
child moved to the State of Pennsylvania. (R: 856-57, 860.) 
4. Eileen Howard testified that the reason Jerry Duncan 
moved to Salt Lake City, Utah, was to visit his relatives and 
decided to stay. (A: 59-60.) 
5. Eileen Howard further testified that there was 
inconsistent contact by Jerry Duncan with the minor child and that 
the child returned from visits tired, soaked, hyperactive, violent, 
unbathed, unlaundered and with a rash. (A: 59-60.) 
6. Sandra Thorderson testified that Jerry Duncan's 
visit were erratic and without advance notice. (R: 747-48.) 
7. Sandra Thorderson further testified that there were 
no extensive telephone contacts with the minor child by Jerry 
Duncan while the child lived in Pennsylvania. (R: 725.) 
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8. Larry Thorderson testified that Jerry Duncan did not 
request many visits with the minor child while the boy lived in the 
State of Utah. (R: 865.) 
9. During the period of September through November of 
1992, when Eileen Howard brought the minor child to the State of 
Utah, she reports that the child returned agitated and with food 
allergies because Jerry Duncan did not follow the food lists. (R: 
1059-63.) 
10. Eileen Howard further stated that during the course 
of visits between Jerry Duncan and the minor child in September 
through November of 1992, the child did not like spending time with 
Jerry Duncan and that she was concerned about the child's safety. 
(R: 1059-63.) 
11. The evaluation conducted by Todd Otanez involved 
only Jerry Duncan and Eileen Howard. (R: 162.) 
12. Todd Otanez merely met Sandra Thorderson and had one 
telephone contact with Larry Thorderson. He did not address the 
interests of Sandra and Larry Thorderson in his custody evaluation 
report. (A: 30-48.) 
13. Todd Otanez did not do any psychological testing of 
the natural parents, Jerry Duncan and Eileen Howard. (R: 553, 561, 
564, 566, 569.) 
14. Todd Otanez did not report that there was a strong 
mutual bond between Jerry Duncan and the minor child. (R: 541.) 
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15. Jerry Duncan did not take the minor child to any 
therapist or counselors prior to the transfer of the minor child 
in June of 1995. In addition, Jerry Duncan never took the minor 
child to visit Dr. Daniel Moore. (R: 710.) 
16. In accordance with the memorandum decision of the 
Honorable John A. Rokich, datted December 6, 1994, the child1s 
therapist was to communicate with Jerry Duncans therapist to 
establish a treatment program and a visiting schedule for the 
appellants which was to be submitted to the court for approval by 
the end of the school year. (Appendix, p. 7.) Dr. Steven 
Richfield was the childfs therapist through the Thordersons. Jerry 
Duncan notified the appellants that his therapist was Newt Bryson. 
Dr. Steven Richfield and Dr. Newt Bryson communicated on several 
occasions. The necessary documents from the evaluations and 
reports of counselors and therapists was provided to Dr. Newt 
Bryson. As the child was to arrive to the State of Utah in his 
transfer from the State of Pennsylvania in June of 1995, Jerry 
Duncan advised the appellants that he was not going to use Dr. Newt 
Bryson and changed his therapist to Dr. Chris Wehl. As a result, 
the minor child never saw Dr. Newt Bryson. To this date, no 
treatment plan has been submitted to the court. 
17. There was no evidence presented at trial of 
interference by the Thordersons with respect to the relationship 
between Jerry Duncan and the minor child. The Thordersons did not 
in any way brainwash nor did they indoctrinate the minor child 
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a g a i n s t h i s f a t h e r . (R: 1 2 0 - 3 7 , 768 -70 , '' iri i\ P.4, 
1 1 in i ( i in 
IB, Brynne Rivlie stated in her testimony that the child 
was afraid of his fathi»i lerry Dunrnn. (tfl Mri ) 
i'» nrynn n in "I i ui Lliet testified of her concern over 
the parenting skills of Jerri/1 '*"""•l • I',!' "47-48.) 
; i in mi i "; I- P v v> "'" ' • ii x e l < i i" r st. i f i 
*••-• i I i in 1 1 i i 1 1 1 . 1 ! I II i Il 11 11 I were c I e a r i y La i A j and San* 
T h o i d e r s u , (R: 2 3 0 - 3 J . ) 
. I " i • S t e v e n R i c h f i e l d t e s t i f i e d fliiil I hi lu 
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in I he S t a t e o t " t c h , (P: 9 5 6 - 5 8 . ) 
.' " Hi S t even IMrhf ieI r i fmrthmr t e s t if 
IHIIII tin kMHihi hii"r mil f f i c u l l j III d e v e l o p i n g a c lou t •• , .* . .• ^ n s n i p 
w i t h t h e minoi ami.i (R: 9 5 6 - 6 8 . ) 
'uncan m "or made * 
b e h a ^ * I h< n i * ,_,„.. *,^. , 
i t e w a r t C" Smith d e t e r m i n e d t h a t J e r r y Duncan d i d 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT PROPERLY APPLY THE 
HUTCHISON STANDARD IN THIS CASE 
Jerry Duncan did not return to the State of Utah so that 
he could begin to establish a relationship with his son. He came 
to Utah to visit his relatives and decided to stay after his 
arrival. Jerry Duncan did not make an effort to build a 
relationship with his son while the child resided in the State of 
Utah. After the child moved to the State of Pennsylvania with the 
maternal grandparents and the natural mother, Jerry Duncan had very 
sporadic contact with the minor child. Even after he brought his 
motion to obtain temporary custody of the minor child, he 
maintained only sporadic contact with the child. Jerry Duncan 
refused to recognize that the child had serious behavioral problems 
and did not consult with the boy's therapist to make a 
determination of the childfs needs. 
Thordersons have set forth in their brief in depth the 
basis upon which they maintain that they met the requirements of 
the Hutchison standard. Thordersons maintain that they established 
that Jerry Duncan did not develop a strong mutual bond with the 
minor child. He did not have a willingness to sacrifice his own 
interest for that of the minor child. He did not demonstrate 
sympathy and understanding of the minor child. Thordersons not 
only met the requirements of the Hutchison standard but have 
further established that it is in the best interests of the minor 
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relationship with the minor child. All of these w I m es had very 
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in 1 M i l III i,i i in in I I Hi e w 11 iiLiises turthei indicates Lnat they 
little, if any, 'Ii t 1M "I »rdersons. There was 
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1
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scope of the original record n addit y 
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that the Supreme Court remanded the Tuckey ^ase :i e 
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nothing ^resumption t * i,„ H u t c h i s o n . 
Duncan's brief further refers to the case of State ex 
rel. H.R.V., 278 Adv. Rep. 13 (Ct. App. 11/22/95). Duncan's brief 
states that this decision is distinguishable from the case at bar. 
Duncan's brief states that Jerry Duncan never lost custody of his 
son nor did the appellants ever rebut the presumption and gain 
custody of the child. The Thordersons have, in fact, had custody 
of the minor child by virtue of an order from the State of 
Pennsylvania and an order for temporary custody from the Utah 
Court. Jerry Duncan never had custody of his son. It is true that 
Jerry Duncan did not lose the custody of his son to a nonparent by 
court proceeding; however, there is important language in this 
recent case. This court stated the following concerning the 
parental presumption articulated in Hutchison v. Hutchison, 649 
P.2d 38, 40 (Utah 1982) : 
The presumption normally works "in favor of a 
natural parent who has the care, custody and 
control of his or her child." Kishpaugh v. 
Kishoauqh
 r 745 P.2d 1248, 1250 (Utah 1987) 
(emphasis added). Indeed, all the Utah cases 
previously requiring a trial court to consider 
the parental presumption have involved 
situations where a natural parent is, for the 
first time, in danger of losing legal custody 
to a nonparent. See, e.g., Cooper v. DeLand. 
652 P.2d 907 (Utah 1982); Hutchison v. 
Hutchisonr 649 P.2d 38; Walton v. Coffman, 110 
Utah 1, 169 P.2d 97 (1946). 
Furthermore, sound policy dictates that the 
parental presumption should not apply once the 
natural parent has lost custody of his or her 
child. The presumption recognizes the benefits 
of having loving and able parents raise their 
children despite the willingness of nonparents 
who may possess superior caretaking skills. 
However, the parental presumption is based on 
the characteristics pertaining to a health 
parent-child relationship. When custody has 
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1:: •  = .i :t transferred from a i latura Il parent to a 
i in ::  i ip a i: ei it, it is because the par ent has been 
shown to lack those parental characteristics 
which give rise to the presumption. To allow 
the parent to later rely on the presumption in 
petitioning for restoration of custody would 
allow the parent to rely on a nonexistent 
relationship and to benefit from, a biological 
designation lacking any real meaning. 
Most, importantly, children have a right to be 
loved, protected, and cared for, and society 
has an interest in seeing that they are. 
Allowing a natural parent to reassert the 
parental presumption after the parent 1s own 
conduct has destroyed that presumption would 
do nothing to further the children 1s rights or 
society's goals. Neither would such a practice 
serve the children's long-recognized need for 
stability in relationships. See Elmer v. 
Elmer, 776 P.2d 599, 602 (Utah 1980). ("[T]he 
emotional, intellectual, and moral development 
of a child depends upon a reasonable degree of 
stability in its relationships to important 
people and to its environment.") 
b^ nart;.icu -S based upon the 
characteristics pertaining t a healthy -chi:d relationship, 
7he trial record 
existed between Jerry Dune i >w. : r h u court fun 
states that t"<> allow a par "»ITI t-i i \ .« 
in mi '.."X i . s l . e n l i lationship Lot *.:...: purpose of benefiting 
from a biological designation as the parent .lacks any real mean;ng. 
To place a child with an arfiii.i I parent whr ;, : her r lihi* i 
ii'1'* I i i |]|""'ii I " I I h i I ' l d L l u n s l i i f j In. leats the i;hi Id's lung-
recotjni^ed iiecu nor stabil i I y l m Uins recent case*, the court 
stated that tho Hutchison case does in i i |iiirr in 11 m i 11? x i m i lie, 
1
 ' i " i i i I-'!" 1 11 1 nrp presented neeu unJ y prove a 
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"general" lack, rather than a complete lack, of parental 
characteristics. Jdf. at 15. The Thordersons maintain that since 
Jerry Duncan did not have a healthy parent-child relationship with 
Clel Howard, the easoning set forth in State ex. ~el. H.R.V. is 
applicable. 
Duncan's brief further makes reference to Walton v. 
Coffman. 110 Utah 1, 169 P.2d 97 (1946). The Supreme Court of Utah 
in this decision recognized that the presumption is one of fact, 
not one of law, and may be overcome by any competent evidence which 
is sufficient to satisfy a reasonable mind. Id. at 103. Reference 
is further made of the Walton decision in Kishpauah v. Kishpauah, 
745 P.2d 1248 (Utah 1987). In the Kishpauah case, the natural 
father appealed from an order awarding custody of his natural child 
to the maternal grandparents. The natural parents were divorced 
from one another and the natural mother was awarded the custody of 
the minor child. She never assumed actual custody of the child and 
the boy continued to reside with the maternal grandparents. The 
natural father was aware that the maternal grandparents had actual 
custody and were caring for the minor child. He subsequently filed 
a petition for custody. The maternal grandparents responded by 
filing a petition to obtain guardianship over the minor child. The 
facts in Kishpauah are similar to the facts in the case at bar. 
In Kishpauah, the trial court recognized that under 
Hutchison, there is a presumption that the custody of a child 
should be awarded to a natural parent. The trial court found that 
the presumption was rebutted and proceeded with the determination 
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and placement of the child for his best interests. The Supreme 
Court of Utah in Kishpauqh, stated the following: 
The presumption favoring natural parents is 
analogous to the presumption favoring an 
existing custody arrangement. Like the natural 
parent presumption, the existing placement 
presumption is based on the assumption that it 
will normally serve the best interests of the 
child. 
Id. at 1251. The natural father contended that the trial court 
erred in evaluating his claim and that of the maternal grandparents 
on an equal footing. He maintained that there was a showing of a 
strong mutual bond between himself and his son andf therefore, the 
Hutchison requirements were not met. The Supreme Court pointed out 
that case law was silent on whether Hutchison's three negative 
findings must be made in almost mechanical fashion before a trial 
court can properly conclude that the presumption in favor of the 
natural parent has been overcome. Id. at 1252. 
The Supreme Court continued to state that Hutchison 
itself indicates that it does not establish a wooden formula to 
which all trial court findings must conform. The Supreme Court 
held that Hutchison states that the parental presumption can be 
rebutted only by evidence establishing that a particular parent at 
a particular time generally lacks all three of the characteristics 
that give rise to the presumption. Obviously, a "general" lack is 
not an absolute lack. Thus, the standard articulate in Hutchison 
is somewhat flexible. Id. at 1252. The Supreme Court held 
Hutchison requires an overall evaluation of the relationship 
between the parent and the child. The very purpose of the 
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presumption is in no way advanced by requiring a formulaic 
statement of the trial court's conclusions regarding the three 
characteristics. Jd. at 1252. 
The Supreme Court concluded that the natural parent 
presumption has been rebutted when a court finds a general lack of 
the three characteristics set forth in Hutchison. It found that 
the trial court did not characterize the bond as a "strong mutual" 
one in Kishpaugh. On the other hand, it found that there was a 
"deep bond between" Brian (the minor child) and his grandparents. 
Given the inherent imprecision of words when used and characterized 
emotional attachments and the highly fact-dependent, 
interdependent, and individualized nature of these determinations, 
the Supreme Court concluded that trial judge's findings, read as 
a whole, satisfied the requirements of the Hutchison test. 
In the case at bar, the memorandum decision of the trial 
court does not make a finding of any strong mutual bond between the 
minor child, Clel Howard, and the natural father, Jerry Duncan. 
The trial court found that Clel's strongest bond appeared to be 
with his maternal grandmother. In fact, the trial court indicated 
from the testimony of the custody evaluators that Clel had the 
ability to develop a strong bond with his father; however, this 
would clearly infer that there was not a strong mutual bond which 
existed between the boy and his father. 
The Thordersons maintain that the court erred in finding 
that there was a willingness by the natural father to sacrifice 
his own interest and welfare for that of the child. There was no 
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evidence that the Thordersons were not cooperative with the natural 
father in developing a father/son relationship. The Thordersons 
defer to their original brief which is on file with this court. 
The trial court further erred in stating that there was 
no significant evidence that the natural father lacked the sympathy 
for and understanding of the minor child as characteristic of 
parents generally. The trial court erred in making its finding 
that the natural father understood the problems of the minor child. 
The Thordersons again defer to their original brief on file with 
this court. The natural father did not make any attempt to 
understand the problems of the child nor did he have any regular 
contact with the boy. The Thordersons did not interfere with his 
relationship with the minor child nor did they brainwash the child 
against the natural father. 
A maternal grandmother instituted a proceeding in the 
district court to restrain the State Division of Family Services 
from placing her grandchild out for adoption. Wilson v. Family 
Services Div., Reg. 2, 554 P.2d 227 (Utah 1976). The court made 
a determination that the child should not be placed with the 
natural parents and that the child should be placed for adoption. 
The Supreme Court of Utah held that the matter of a family 
relationship may be a factor which should be given due and serious 
consideration. The court held that according to the laws of nature 
and human experience that such immediate relatives, often referred 
to as next of kin, have some legitimate concern for children of the 
family and interest in their welfare. Id. at 230. The court wfcnt 
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on to reason that in "custody matters" all things else being equal, 
near relatives generally being an equal, near relatives should 
generally be given preference over nonrelatives. The maternal 
grandmother in this case came forward promptly to express her love 
and concern for the grandchild and offered to provide him with a 
home and support. The restraining order was ordered to be 
reinstated by the Supreme Court. Id. at 231. It is clear in this 
case that grandparents are seriously to be considered for custody, 
all things else being equal. 
In summary, Clel Howard has had a long-standing close 
relationship with the maternal grandparents. This presumption 
places the Thordersons on equal footing with the natural father, 
Jerry Duncan. The Thordersons seriously question the parental 
presumption in favor of Jerry Duncan in that there was not a 
healthy parent-child relationship existing between father and son 
when Jerry Duncan sought custody of the minor child. Jerry 
Duncan's inaction was the reason for the absence of this 
relationship. This lack of relationship between father and son was 
not caused by the Thordersons. The Thordersons further maintain 
that they rebutted the presumption of the natural parent under 
Hutchison standard at the time of trial. The trial record has 
numerous reports and testimony from therapists and counselors that 
the stability of the minor child was found in his close 
relationship and his residence with the Thordersons. The 
conclusions of the experts clearly place Clel Howard with the 
Thordersons. 
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POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING APPELLANTS' 
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 
Duncan's brief cites Watkiss & Campbell v. Foa & Son, 808 
P.2d 1061 (Utah 1991). In this specific case, the plaintiffs filed 
a motion for summary judgment and the district court determined 
that no genuine issue of material fact existed resulting in summary 
judgment. In the case at bar, the matter did not involve a motion 
for summary judgment. The entire matter was heard at trial. In 
Watkiss & Campbell, the Supreme Court of Utah treated a motion for 
reconsideration by the defense as a motion for new trial. The 
facts of that case are clearly distinguished from the case at bar. 
In the case at bar, there was extensive evidence in the form of 
witnesses and exhibits presented at the time of trial. The motion 
of the Thordersons was, in fact, a motion for reconsideration based 
upon the material facts and evidence presented at the time of 
trial. 
The Duncan brief further references Crookston v. Fire 
Insurance Exchange. 860 P.2d 937 (Utah 1993). This case involved 
an action against a property insurer asserting multiple claims 
under contract and tort theories in connection with failure to pay 
a claim. The jury verdict awarded slightly more than $800,000.00 
in compensatory damages and $4,000,000.00 in punitive damages. The 
insurer appealed. The Supreme Court of Utah remanded the case for 
reconsideration of whether the punitive damages award was 
excessive. The Supreme Court ruled that a new trial to allow the 
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jury to reconsider its award after receiving new instructions under 
the holding of the Supreme Court on a prior appeal was not 
necessary. The facts of this case are clearly distinguishable from 
the case at bar. In the Crookston case, the insurer was seeking 
a new trial. The Thordersons were not seeking a new trial by 
filing a motion for reconsideration. There was no signed order or 
judgment entered at the time of the filing of the motion for 
reconsideration. The trial court brought counsel into chambers 
after the trial and prior to the issuance of the memorandum 
decision and stated that there would be a hearing at the end of a 
120 day period after the minor child had been placed with the 
natural father to determine whether the child had made the 
adjustment from the Thordersons to Jerry Duncan. This decision of 
the trial court did not appear in the memorandum decision. In 
addition, the Thordersons filed a supplemental brief after the date 
of trial and prior to the issuance of the memorandum decision 
referring the court to Tuckey v. Tuckev, 649 P.2d 88 (Utah 1982) 
and Kishpauah v. Kishpauahf 745 P.2d 1248 (Utah 1987) . These cases 
clearly interpreted the Hutchison standard and addressed the equal 
footing of the maternal grandparents in that the presumption in 
favor of an existing custody arrangement should be carefully 
considered against the presumption in favor of a natural parent. 
Duncan's brief states that with the passing of almost a 
full month before the minute entry is difficult to say that Judge 
Rokich did not consider the motion of the appellants. There is no 
evidence to support this statement. The motion for reconsideration 
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was clearly relevant to the issues at bar in the denial of such 
motion by the trial court was error. 
CONCLUSION 
The close relationship of Clel Howard with the maternal 
grandparents was of long standing. There was a very healthy 
relationship between the maternal grandparents and the minor child. 
This presumption clearly placed the Thordersons on at least an 
equal footing with the natural father, Jerry Duncan. The 
Thordersons further maintain that there was not a healthy parent-
child relationship between Jerry Duncan and Clel Howard and, as a 
result, the parental presumption would not even apply. The trial 
court clearly erred in failing to find that the parental 
presumption did not apply or, in the alternative, that the 
Thordersons were on equal footing with the natural father. As a 
result, the best interests of the minor child was at issue before 
the trial court. Overwhelming evidence from both lay witnesses and 
experts, clearly indicate that the child should remain with the 
maternal grandparents and that there would be substantial injury 
by transfer of the child to the natural father. In addition, 
Thordersons claim that they clearly met the three requirements of 
the Hutchison standard at the time of trial anyway. 
The trial judge met with counsel in chambers after trial 
and before the memorandum decision and made certain findings. 
These findings were not reflected in the memorandum decision. In 
addition, the supplemental brief of the Thordersons was presented 
to the court prior to the entry of a signed order and judgment. 
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Thordersons maintain that the trial court should have granted the 
motion for reconsideration under Rule 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure and erred in the denial of this motion. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this /p/~ day of /"Yia^ 
1996. 
U JOm SPEAKER SNOW 
Xttorney Hcor Appellants 
Larry and Sandra Thorderson 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I am an employee of the law office 
of John Spencer Snow; and that in said capacity and pursuant to 
Rule 21(d) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, two true and 
accurate copies of the foregoing reply brief of appellants was 
mailed to Wendy M. Lewis, attorney for respondent, 50 West 
Broadway, Suite 400, Salt Lake City, Utah 84101; and to Leslie W. 
Slaugh, attorney for appellant, Eileen Howard, 120 East 300 North, 
Provo, Utah 84606, postage prepaid, this /jy*- day of 
/^Y)dircl , 1996. 
ft, Qoi -
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ADDENDUM 
Third Judicial District 
DEC 0 G m 
SAL I LAKfc lUUfr f Y 
B y — — 
Deputy Clark 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JEROME K. DUNCAN, : MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Plaintiff, : CASE NO. 910905919 
vs. : 
EILEEN M. HOWARD, et al., : 
Defendants• : 
This case was tried on September 28f 29, 30, 1994. Plaintiff 
was represented by Dean B. Ellis. Defendants Sandra and Larry 
Thorderson were represented by John Spencer Snow. Defendant Eileen 
Howard was represented by Leslie Slaugh. The Court heard oral 
testimony, admitted documentary evidence and reviewed in detail the 
custody evaluations submitted by the respective parties. The Court 
took the matter under advisement. 
FACTS 
The child, Clel Howard, who is the subject matter of these 
proceedings is the natural child of Jerome Duncan and Eileen 
Howard. Clel was born out of wedlock on October 12, 1988. 
Plaintiff learned of Clel's birth three months after Clel's 
birth and commenced paying $150 per month for Clel's support. 
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Plaintiff paid support for about four and one-half years and 
established a regular routine of weekly visits with Clel. 
In 1991, plaintiff filed a paternity action and established 
that he was the natural father of Clel. Upon the establishment of 
paternity, visitation with Clel was resumed until April 7, 1992 
when defendant Howard allowed Clel to live with his natural 
grandmother in Pennsylvania. 
A series of hearings were held in the Utah court and in the 
Pennsylvania court regarding visitation and custody of Clel during 
the pendency of this action. Defendants Thorderson were granted 
custodial rights to Clel with the final resolution of custody and 
visitation issues. 
Defendant Howard left Clel when he was nine months old with 
his maternal grandmother. Defendant Howard did not exhibit an 
interest in Clel. Defendant did not develop parental skills or 
develop a bond with Clel. Defendant's lifestyle did not create an 
environment where Clel could be nurtured, loved, shown affection or 
attention that would allow him to have the normal mother/son 
relationship. 
Defendant left the responsibility of raising Clel to her 
mother, who with her husband assumed the role of parents for Clel. 
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Plaintiff, Duncan, is now in his third marriage and exhibited 
a lack of stability in his early adulthood. Plaintiff had two 
adult children by a prior marriage. Plaintiff has not maintained 
a relationship with these children. 
Plaintiff is presently married to Diane Duncan who was 
previously married and had three children by her first marriage. 
She is employed at Stauffers in Utah County. 
Plaintiff is a college graduate and is also employed at 
Stauffers. Plaintiff and his present wife have adequate living 
quarters and income to provide for Clel. 
The defendants Thorderson have had custody of Clel since April 
of 1992 and have assumed the role of parenting Clel. Mrs. 
Thorderson was previously married and had four children by her 
first marriage. This is Mr. Thorderson's first marriage. He is 52 
years old and Mrs. Thorderson is 41 years old. Defendants have a 
stable marriage, and more than adequate living facilities. 
Defendants Thorderson provide a stable environment for Clel. 
As a result of the instability in Clel's life, he has 
developed emotional problems which will require continued therapy 
in order for him to adjust to the custodial and visitation orders 
entered by the Court. 
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ARGUMENT 
In custody disputes between a parent and a non-parent, the 
Utah State Supreme Court has ruled that there is a presumption in 
favor of custody being awarded to the parent which can only be 
rebutted by showing that: (1) no strong mutual bond exists; (2) 
the parent has not demonstrated a willingness to sacrifice his or 
her own interests and welfare for the child's interest and welfare; 
and (3) the parent lacks a sympathy for and understanding of the 
child that is characteristic of parents generally. Hutchinson v. 
Hutchinson, 649 P.2d 38 (Utah 1982). 
Clel's strongest bond appears to be with his maternal 
grandmother which is understandable, because he was placed with her 
shortly after birth. However, his bonding to plaintiff has been 
hampered because plaintiff has not had the opportunity to develop 
the bonding relationship with the child. The review of the file 
and the transcript of those proceeu- gs evidences the resistance 
plaintiff has met in establishing a close relationship with Clel. 
The testimony of the custody evaluators in this case led the Court 
to believe that with continued therapy sessions, Clel can develop 
a strong bond with his father. 
Clel has suffered a great deal of trauma in his life because 
of his mother abandoning him at three months of age, and not being 
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allowed to establish a normal relationship with his father. As a 
result of the trauma in his life, Clel suffers from emotional 
problems which are presently being treated and must be treated for 
an extensive period of time. 
Plaintiff understands that Clel must continue in a therapy 
program in order for Clel to overcome the fears and anxieties he 
has developed as a result of the custodial issue. Plaintiff and 
defendants have expressed a willingness to continue to work with 
therapists to resolve Clel's emotional problems. 
Plaintiff has demonstrated a willingness to sacrifice his own 
interest and welfare for the child's. It is evident that plaintiff 
cared about Clel and is willing to sacrifice his own interests for 
the child's, however, the defendants were not cooperative and did 
not further a father/son relationship between Clel and plaintiff. 
There was no significant evidence that plaintiff lacked the 
sympathy for and understanding of the child that is characteristic 
of parents generally. The Court believes that plaintiff 
understands the problems that have been created by Clel being born 
out of wedlock, the abandonment of Clel by his mother, and the lack 
of regular visitation by him with Clel. 
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Plaintiff's extended family testified about the importance of 
family and are desirous of making Clel an integral part of the 
extended family. 
The Court has considered Clel's feelings in this case and 
understands the apprehension he may have in establishing a new 
home, a new environment and the sense of security he may have with 
the defendants Thordersons. However, the Court is convinced that 
with the cooperation of all of the parties and the continued 
therapy sessions for Clel, that Clel can make the adjustment to new 
surroundings satisfactorily. 
Clel would probably prefer to remain with defendants 
Thorderson, because they have been the primary caretakers for most 
of his life. However, defendants Thordersons created much of the 
problem in Clel accepting his father because of their resistance to 
allowing plaintiff to become the father he desired to be. The fact 
that he had to file a lawsuit is indicative of the defendant's 
resistance to allow plaintiff to be a father. 
There is no evidence that plaintiff is now engaged in immoral 
activity. The Court believes that the plaintiff has matured from 
the time he met defendant Howard and is a much more stable person 
than he was in 1988. 
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Granted, plaintiff does not enjoy the same economic status of 
the Thordersons, but he has the financial means by which to 
adequately provide for Clel's needs. 
In this case plaintiff and defendants are of the same 
religious faith and are active members, assuring Clel of compatible 
religious training with plaintiff and defendants. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court awards custody to plaintiff, subject to the 
following conditions. 
1. Clel shall remain with the Thordersons until the end of 
the present school year. Ten days after the school year ends, Clel 
shall be delivered to plaintiff at Salt Lake City at plaintiff's 
expense. 
2. Clel shall remain in the therapy program that he is 
presently enrolled, and the therapist shall prepare Clel for the 
transition of custody to his father. Plaintiff and defendants 
Thorderson shall bear the costs equally. 
3. Plaintiff's therapist and Thorderson's therapist shall 
communicate and establish a treatment program and a visiting 
schedule for defendant Howard and defendants Thorderson to visit 
with Clel which shall be submitted to the Court for approval by the 
end of the school year. 
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4. Plaintiff and defendant shall name their therapists 
within 30 days from the date of entry of this Judgment* 
Each party shall bear their own fees and costs. 
Plaintiff's counsel shall prepare Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of law, and a Judgment in accordance with this 
Memorandum Decision. 
Dated this & day of December, 1994. 
JOHN A. ROK^ Cli 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Memorandum Decision, to the following, this /^ day of 
December, 1994: 
Maddi-Jane Sobel 
Dean B. Ellis 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
3600 S. Market Street 
West Valley City, Utah 84119 
Leslie Slaugh 
Attorney for Defendant 
P.O. Box 778 
Provo, Utah 84603 
John Spencer Snow 
Attorney for Defendants Thorderson 
261 East 300 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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